Hungary's Tourism Governance Experiments Have Failed the Test of Trust

A Szalloda.blog organisational-psychology analysis of leadership appointments, the risks created by a lack of transparency, and why we would move tourism policy to the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Development.
Tourism 360 | Tamás Pakuts | 24 September 2026
In May, before his appointment, István Kapitány loudly promised a dedicated tourism state secretariat at his parliamentary committee hearing, stressing the industry's strategic importance. Perhaps this was his first and last occasion to speak about tourism with that institutional status and focus.
The government's subsequently published list of state secretaries, however, contained no such position. Who removed it, and why? Why was the change not communicated clearly, comprehensibly and transparently?
Since then, several major tourism organisations have acquired new leaders. MTÜ now describes the creation of a new tourism governance system as part of its CEO's mission, yet Kapitány's ministry remains silent on Olivér Csendes's mandate despite its obligations relating to public-information requests. The issue is not whether something happened — presumably it did, at least according to the minister's publicity. It is whether these and future steps can deliver the promised strategic representation, and how the new system's results will be judged. Too many variables remain unknown.
In tourism, an appointment is never merely a personnel matter. Hotels, restaurants, spas, travel agencies, attractions, transport providers and destinations can work meaningfully with central institutions only if they understand who decides, under what authority, whom they consult and according to which criteria. If the process is invisible, subsequent decisions encounter obstacles and may stall.
The Announcement Does Not Account for the Original Promise
There can be professional arguments for a dedicated tourism state secretariat, and equally for another organisational structure. What cannot be omitted is an explanation of the change: who decided, on what grounds, where policy responsibility now sits and how the ministry cooperates with MTÜ.
Ágnes Fábián is the ministry's state secretary for economic development. Meanwhile, István Kapitány personally announced leadership changes across tourism organisations. MTÜ CEO Olivér Csendes is, by the agency's own description, developing a new governance system. These three facts do not yet tell the profession clearly where political direction ends, policy decisions begin or responsibility for outcomes lies. Kapitány places himself before Fábián, making the state secretary largely invisible and seemingly weightless in tourism. Whether that is protective or fearful is unclear.
Such uncertainty can be hidden for a while in day-to-day operations. During crises, funding disputes and changes of strategy it becomes crucial. If responsibility is spread across several levels but their powers are unclear, each participant can wait for and point at another. Eventually, nobody knows whom to approach for a solution.
The Visible Pattern: Action, but a Less Visible Decision Chain
It would be wrong to judge the current situation on one broken promise. The original undertaking, new institutional structure, appointments and explanations of decisions must be examined together.

Element of the Pattern | What Is Visible in Tourism | What Still Needs Clarification |
Major Promise | István Kapitány discussed a dedicated tourism state secretariat at his ministerial hearing. | When and why did this plan change? |
Different Implementation | The official list of state secretaries contains no separate tourism state secretary. | Who received clear policy responsibility and authority instead? |
New Leadership Decisions | MTÜ and several organisations in its portfolio have new leaders. | What role definitions, selection criteria and measurable goals accompanied each appointment? |
Delayed Feedback | According to Szalloda.blog, the extension of a public-information request came only after the deadline and a reminder of the failure. | Where were the decision-preparation records created and how may they be accessed? |
The first two points compare a public commitment with the official government list. MTÜ publishes information about leadership roles; our description of the information request is based on our own previously documented experience. The table does not assert that internal deliberation never took place. It identifies unanswered questions in the public domain.
Organisational Defensiveness First Tries to Push Difficult Questions Aside
Organisational researcher Chris Argyris used the concept of defensive routines to describe organisations that reduce tension instead of processing inconvenient evidence, thereby obstructing their own learning. Meyer and Rowan identified a related risk: a formally orderly structure can become separated from actual practice. These are not psychological diagnoses of individuals, but frameworks through which tourism governance may be examined.
What happens when leaders make a promise they cannot keep and then try to substitute something different? A learning organisation acknowledges the discrepancy, explains the decision and accepts measurement of the new solution against the original goal. A defensive organisation more easily diverts attention towards fresh announcements. An appointment, subsidy programme or highly publicised meeting may be a real measure, but none explains by itself why the earlier promise was abandoned. This is precisely what, in our editorial view, the ministry is doing: obscuring and deflecting. It risks deceiving itself, overlooking actual events and creating avoidable problems.
The possible organisational process can be described as follows:

This process is dangerous not because every ministry announcement is necessarily false. The danger is that it does not answer the profession's question. The ministry tries to create the impression that it has acted; the profession wants to know why that action was chosen, which alternatives were considered and who is accountable. If that conversation becomes impossible or meaningless, the sector cannot provide meaningful feedback and becomes isolated, while the leadership becomes less accessible and credible.
In August, Szalloda.blog submitted a public-information request concerning the preparation of tourism leadership appointments. We documented previously that no substantive answer or extension arrived by the original deadline, and the extension was communicated only after we pointed out the omission. Subsequent responses still left open where the records evaluating candidates and their suitability were created.
A ministry's ability to learn is revealed by how it responds when asked not to advertise its successes but to explain the basis for decisions and demonstrate the transparency it promised yet does not appear to treat as binding.
The late and, in our view, outrageously incomplete response, disregarding statutory requirements, does not by itself establish deliberate deception, although the editorial assessment is that the conduct was intentional. Regardless, the professional consequences are real: when information is difficult to obtain, speculation fills the gaps. Appointing authorities may face less immediate scrutiny, but those appointed face more over the long term.
Newly Appointed Leaders Also Pay the Price for Closed Selection
According to MTÜ's official portfolio page, Botond Boros heads Visit Hungary, Andrea Róna heads Kisfaludy Tourism Support Nonprofit Plc, and Andrea Tóth heads EXPO 2027 Exhibition Nonprofit Ltd. Olivér Csendes is MTÜ's chairman and CEO. Their roles and professional backgrounds differ. Yet the same questions apply to each: what were the predefined requirements, were other candidates considered, how were suitability and potential conflicts of interest examined, and what results are expected?
The public profiles reviewed do not add up to complete selection documentation. That does not establish that candidates were not considered internally or that any appointment was unlawful. Both open competition and direct appointment exist in the public sector, but the ministry did not explain the methodology. In that information vacuum, rumours circulate that no better candidates could be found, others refused the posts, and willing candidates were chosen at the last minute amid increasing scrutiny. These are rumours, not demonstrated facts.
According to the OECD, even systems allowing broad appointment discretion benefit when professional requirements are clear and the selection process transparent.
Organisational-psychology costs begin with procedural justice. People judge not only an outcome, but the fairness of the procedure. When the process is unknown, appointed leaders may have to defend their authority with every professional decision. The ministry's lack of transparency creates precisely that risk. A good decision may be dismissed as 'the minister's person's decision'; a bad one reinforces criticism of the selection process, ministry and leadership.

Potential Effect of an Incomplete Selection Explanation | How It May Affect Appointed Leaders |
Borrowed Legitimacy | Professionals may see the new leader primarily as the minister's appointee, requiring separate proof of independence. |
Constant Debate About Origins | The circumstances of selection repeatedly displace discussions of professional performance. |
Cautious Leadership | Sensitive decisions and open debates may be postponed when leaders feel their mandate is disputed. |
Olivér Csendes's position is especially sensitive because he was a prominent and stable figure in the previous Gullner era that the current reforms ostensibly aim to replace. MTÜ describes data-driven, transparent operations and substantive provider dialogue as pillars of its new system. Its leader can credibly represent those promises only if the organisation is also able to explain its own decisions.
For Andrea Róna, overseeing the support-grant system makes transparency about selection and conflicts of interest particularly important; it could protect her reputation against the appearance of favouritism. Her professional history has multiple connections with Quaestor and Csaba Tarsoly, Demján's Trigránit, the Mészáros-linked Hunguest and Opus groups, and the Rahimkulov family, which continues RONA Consulting. In such circumstances, we consider silence and delay unacceptable. The ministry used a deadline extension and only thirty days later said it was not the data controller, without forwarding the request ex officio to the relevant MTÜ organisation.
Botond Boros's country-brand and marketing decisions, and Andrea Tóth's EXPO responsibilities, should be assessed against clear objectives, costs and outcomes. Both also deserved meaningful recognition, as returning or continuing figures from the Gullner period.
The Publicised First Consultation with 'The Five' Created a Misleading Appearance
The ministry initially consulted five long-established industry associations. The organisational-psychology risk is that leadership treats the feedback of this narrow group as representative of the entire sector. Meetings with familiar partners run smoothly while those excluded never bring their problems to the table.
False consensus can then develop: everyone in the room discusses the same concerns, so leaders feel they understand the industry. Meanwhile, the perspectives of spas, guides, rural small businesses and independent operators are absent. Excluding or marginalising critical voices can worsen decisions because information exposing systemic failures is lost.
Ultimately, a Trust Deficit Also Affects Tourism Performance
The risks do not end with a poorly communicated appointment. Tourism businesses contribute money, time, information and expertise to shared systems.
If participants believe only a select group can influence decisions, they become less willing to raise problems frankly. Organisational-silence research indicates that withholding inconvenient information makes identifying and correcting mistakes more difficult.
In Hungarian tourism, regularly invited organisations may receive disproportionate attention while smaller companies, rural regions and less visible parts of the sector speak later. Funding decisions may arouse distrust even when professionally justified if eligibility and assessment criteria are opaque. Diffuse responsibility can slow decisions requiring cooperation between the ministry, MTÜ and affiliated companies.
The following is a qualitative assessment of risk, not a finding of actual damage or a numerical probability.

Risk | Level | Possible Manifestation in Hungarian Tourism |
Narrower Professional Feedback | High | Regularly included organisations gain prominence while smaller firms, regions and specialist groups reach decision-makers late. |
Distrust of Funding Distribution | High | Opaque criteria can make even well-founded grants look like decisions based on personal connections. |
Blurred Accountability | High | It is unclear whether a minister, state secretary, MTÜ or subsidiary decides and who must correct errors. |
Short-Term Announcement-Driven Governance | Medium–High | Easily publicised measures can take priority over slower, systemic work. |
Reduced Independence of Appointed Leaders | Medium–High | Appointees spend more effort defending their credibility and less openly discussing difficult professional decisions. |
Weaker Strategic Adaptation | Medium | When difficult data and dissent do not reach senior leadership, the system corrects mistakes later. |
Lack of transparency in appointments does not automatically establish an absence of competition in later tenders or procurement. These questions require separate examination. But the less is known about the initial appointment, the more important it becomes that later rules, outcomes and conflicts-of-interest checks can be verified.

What If the Industrious 'Ant', Rather Than the Hero of the Success Story, Led the Way?
Tourism does not necessarily need a more charismatic or louder leader. It may need one less concerned with being the face of every success. The difference appears when a promise is broken, a decision sparks controversy or professionals submit inconvenient evidence.
A leadership team invested in its own image of success can perceive such events as threats. Attention then moves from correcting mistakes to protecting the leader's standing: a new announcement replaces explanation, criticism looks hostile and staff learn which bad news not to pass upwards. The question is not whether a leader enjoys success, but whether they can handle facts showing something has failed.
An agile, intelligent and hardworking 'ant' leader would begin differently: collect unanswered questions, clarify responsibilities, publish criteria for appointments and funding, and regularly report what has and has not been delivered. Agility here means faster learning: responding to professional feedback, adjusting plans and explaining changes.
That would also change the situation of appointed leaders. Olivér Csendes could build MTÜ's new organisation under a public mandate. Transparent conflict-of-interest rules and grant criteria would protect Andrea Róna's work. Botond Boros and Andrea Tóth could be assessed against previously agreed objectives. They could become independently accountable professional decision-makers instead of characters in an appointment story.
The 'ant' leader need not win every argument. They need an organisation able to recognise in time when it is heading in the wrong direction. Amy Edmondson's research links psychological safety to better team learning, while research on leader humility examines modelling behaviour and team performance. For Hungarian tourism the implication is practical: rural providers, spa managers and tour operators must be heard even when they reveal something that is failing.
The grasshopper and the ant represent two approaches to leadership. In one, announcements are treated as evidence of performance. In the other, performance is organised so errors, dissent and results can all be checked. Tourism would benefit more from the second.
Tourism Needs a Different Ministry
Our conclusion is clear: tourism should be moved from the Ministry for the Economy and Energy to the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Development. It needs a dedicated, accountable professional authority in a ministry whose daily remit is developing communities, towns and regions. That receiving ministry is led by Viktória Lőrincz and has a dedicated rural and regional development state secretariat.
Moving ministry would solve nothing by itself if the same closed appointment and decision-making practices simply migrated to another building. The new structure would need a clear tourism mandate, public leadership requirements, genuine participation and verifiable funding decisions. The Ministry of Rural and Municipal Development's recently launched participatory regional initiative shows that involving local stakeholders and open selection are already present in one concrete programme. That mindset should extend across tourism.
This matters for Budapest and international tourism too. A country's tourism strength emerges from the cooperation of its capital, regions, transport, hospitality businesses and local services. Governance therefore needs to incorporate regional differences and locally held expertise into decisions.
Tourism needs a new institutional home. We see that home in the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Development rather than the current economic ministry — with independent professional representation, open decisions and leaders who value the next better decision more than appearing infallible.

Sources
István Kapitány's ministerial-candidate committee hearing, 11 May 2026.
Hungarian Tourism Agency (MTÜ) — management and corporate portfolio.
Szalloda.blog — Tourism Needs a New, Competent and Attentive Institutional Home.
Chris Argyris — Teaching Smart People How to Learn; Meyer and Rowan — Institutionalized Organizations.
Tyler and Blader — The Group Engagement Model; Morrison — Employee Voice and Silence.
Amy Edmondson — Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams; Owens and Hekman — How Does Leader Humility Influence Team Performance?
Ministry of Rural and Municipal Development — participatory regional programme and application announcement.
AI transparency: We used artificial intelligence to find, compare and organise sources and to assist with editing. The interpretation and conclusions reflect Szalloda.blog's editorial position. Public sources were checked as of 24 September 2026.
This article was translated from the original Hungarian using artificial intelligence. The original language is Hungarian.
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