Pécs–Pogány Airport: Another failure or a fundamentally flawed strategy?

The history of international flights, the current crisis, and an analysis of the real underlying problems

For nearly two decades, the history of Pécs–Pogány Airport has been repeating the same pattern: international flights launched with great expectations, followed by a brief period of optimism, and ultimately ending either in a quiet withdrawal or a highly visible failure.

The story has now reached another turning point, as Skyhub PAD will suspend its operations effective June 10, 2026, directly affecting the Pécs–Munich connection, according to the virtual carrier’s announcement issued on May 27, 2026.

The flights — only recently integrated into the Lufthansa network and physically operated by DAT — will cease operations within two weeks due to economic reasons.

Many view this as just another temporary setback, yet the reality runs far deeper. In the case of Pécs, we are not simply talking about the failure of an individual airline or route connection, but rather about a structural regional transport and economic development problem.

In reality, however, the story began much earlier

Pécs is not attempting to build a genuine regional aviation strategy for the first time — let us look back to the early 2000s.

During the administration led by Mayor László Toller, serious plans were developed for the airport’s expansion and international integration. At the time, a much closer strategic cooperation was planned with the Dutch airline Denim Air, including the establishment of an airline with municipal participation and a permanently based aircraft fleet in Pécs.

The market environment at the time was, of course, entirely different:

• the low-cost model had not yet come to dominate Europe,

• regional feeder networks were considerably stronger,

• and the development of Central European regional airports was only just beginning.

At that time, Pécs–Pogány Airport still lacked many of the infrastructural and technical features that would be considered basic requirements today. Nevertheless, one of the most comprehensive and realistic business concepts for the airport’s future was developed during that period.

Even at that time, the model was not built around a single scheduled route alone, but rather focused on:

• multiple destinations,

• regional cooperation,

• code-share partnerships,

• as well as long-term capital investment.

According to the plans, the operation would have required:

• significant state support,

• private capital,

• cooperation between several regional airports,

• and the shared management of operational and financial risks.

The concept would also have involved Debrecen International Airport, Maribor Edvard Rusjan Airport and Graz Airport, while the overall strategy was designed around code-share cooperation with major network airlines operating within global alliance systems. This represented a crucial difference compared to the later projects, because it was already clear at the time that a regional airport operating in isolation and relying solely on its local market would be extremely difficult to sustain in the long term.

Unfortunately, due to the accident of Mayor László Toller and the lack of cooperation from the national government, the project ultimately remained only on paper.

Looking at today’s situation, it is particularly interesting to revisit that period, as many of the conclusions and observations made back then still appear highly relevant today.

The old dream: connecting Pécs to Europe

For Pécs, international aviation has always represented a combination of prestige, economic opportunity, investment attraction, and a symbolic “connection to Europe.”

One of the most significant attempts during the 2000s was Austrian Airlines’ Vienna route from Pécs, launched for the European Capital of Culture period. The concept appeared logical, as Vienna could have provided Baranya with access to virtually any destination in the world through global network connections. However, the route was discontinued after a relatively short period, and the reasons went far beyond simply a lack of local demand.

At the same time, the regional feeder model itself was entering a period of crisis across Europe:

• network airlines began rationalising their route structures,

• the operating costs of regional — especially turboprop — services increased dramatically,

• the low-cost model fundamentally reshaped travel habits,

• part of the business travel segment disappeared due to digitalisation,

• and rail transport gradually became an increasingly competitive alternative.

Pécs and its airport are not in an ideal geographical position: Budapest can be reached within 2 to 2.5 hours by car, Vienna is also realistically accessible, and the renovation of Osijek Airport has been completed, allowing it to accommodate larger aircraft. As a result, business travellers tend to choose the more reliable and established alternatives.

Universal Air: not only was the market unprepared, but the airline’s own operation was not ready for its launch either

Universal Air appeared in Pécs in 2024, bringing renewed hopes to the region.

Universal Air appeared in Pécs in 2024, bringing renewed hopes to the region.

The Maltese airline built its concept around the Pécs–Munich–Malta triangle, which at first glance appeared to be a logical structure:

• Munich as a global hub,

• Malta as a tourism destination,

• and Pécs as a regional and university centre.

However, the problem was far more complex than simply a lack of passengers.

From the very beginning, Universal Air’s operation raised serious professional concerns, as the airline was essentially unprepared for the realities of a classic scheduled operation:

• the website and booking system were still not functioning properly around the launch period,

• sales and distribution channels remained limited,

• the brand itself was virtually unknown,

• very little time was available to build marketing presence and passenger confidence,

• and there were no meaningful interline or cooperation agreements with major airlines.

For a regional route, these factors are particularly critical, because passenger confidence and operational predictability are essential. The fleet strategy created additional serious risks and operational weaknesses. Universal Air attempted to operate across multiple markets with an extremely limited and ageing fleet, while maintaining only minimal reserve capacity. Even a single technical issue or aircraft unavailability could trigger a domino effect of delays, cancellations and schedule disruptions. In a small regional market, this becomes especially dangerous, because with only two or three weekly frequencies, even one cancelled flight can cause major reputational damage.

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Universal Air was unable to stabilise its operations not only in Pécs, but also in Debrecen, where the planned operation ultimately never even commenced. This reinforced the perception that the Maltese carrier had attempted to expand too quickly with a business model that was still immature even for its own operational structure.

The failure, therefore, cannot simply be attributed to the Pécs-Baranya market itself.

Skyhub PAD: an other model with different types of risks

The system effectively operated as a virtual airline model, which in itself is not inherently problematic — in fact, several regional connections in Western Europe successfully operate within similar structures.

In the case of Pécs, the operator providing both the AOC and the aircraft for Skyhub PAD was the Danish airline Danish Air Transport, a company widely regarded as an experienced and reliable player in regional aviation.

DAT cannot even be compared to Universal Air, as the Danish operator — unlike Universal — possesses mature regional operational experience, a stable financial background, an adequate fleet, and substantially greater expertise in serving similar secondary and tertiary destinations.

DAT is successfully present in Austria, Italy and several other regional markets; however, a significant portion of these routes are built on PSO-type agreements, state or regional subsidies, public service obligations, and stable institutional financing. This is a critically important distinction, because a small regional route can rarely be sustained purely on market-based principles alone.

One of Pécs’ greatest challenges: nearby competition

Osijek Airport now offers a direct Munich connection operated by the reliable and high-quality Croatia Airlines with Star Alliance connectivity, while London is accessible through Ryanair, and connections to the Croatian coast are also available — all within the Schengen zone.

One of the greatest shortcomings of the Pécs projects was the apparent failure to properly account for regional competition, particularly the growing role of nearby Osijek Airport.

For the counties of Baranya, Bács-Kiskun, Tolna and Somogy, Osijek has become an easily accessible alternative by car. Behind Osijek Airport, the classic logic of regional support schemes appears far more clearly and consistently — an approach that, in the case of Pécs, was often implemented only partially or far too late.

It appears that during the market research phase of the Pécs projects, this regional traffic diversion effect was significantly underestimated.

The most important lesson: in Pécs, only a supported model can realistically work

A regional scheduled air service operating purely on market-based principles is extremely difficult to sustain over the long term.

If the region genuinely wants international air connectivity, some form of PSO-type operational model will be essential, and state involvement will be unavoidable.

In Western Europe, a significant share of regional connections of similar size operate precisely under such frameworks.

The real question is whether there is sufficient long-term political, economic and institutional willingness to support such a model.

Conclusion

The challenges facing Pécs–Pogány Airport are, in reality, not merely aviation-related issues, but questions of regional economic development.

The Universal Air case demonstrated how dangerous an immature and undercapitalised regional model can become. Skyhub PAD, on the other hand, showed that even a more stable operator cannot perform miracles on weak market foundations. Meanwhile, the example of Osijek Airport clearly proves that regional competition no longer stops at national borders.

One of the most important lessons is that certain elements of the strategic concepts developed in the early 2000s appear more relevant today than ever before.

For me personally, this story is particularly important, as I was actively involved as an expert on behalf of Denim Air during the earlier strategic preparation phase of the project.

I remain convinced that a viable airport model for Pécs can exist — but only if it is built upon long-term, integrated regional cooperation, stable financing, genuine market analysis, and a diversified operational structure.

I would be pleased to share the experiences and lessons learned from that period with the municipality of my hometown, Pécs, and with the airport’s leadership in support of a more successful future operation.

The original version of this article was written in Hungarian. The English translation was prepared with the assistance of artificial intelligence.

About the author:

For nearly 35 years, aviation has been a defining part of my professional life.

As both an executive and consultant, I have gained insight into the operations of several airlines, while also contributing to the modification of multiple bilateral air transport agreements concerning the designation of air carriers.

In the mid-1990s, I was the founder of the first Central and Eastern European virtual airline specializing in niche market demands.

I studied international aviation law in Leipzig and earned my Airline Management degree in Geneva.

www.pakuts.com