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Strong Forint, Weak Summer: Who Will Survive Hungary's 2026 Tourism Season?

Writer: Pakuts Tamás
Pakuts Tamás
2 days ago
18 min read

A Strong Forint, a Weak Summer: Who Will Survive Hungary's 2026 Tourism Season? A stronger forint is usually treated as an economic success. For Hungarian tourism, however, it can suppress demand from two directions: Hungary becomes more expensive for foreign guests, while Croatia, Italy, Greece, Austria and other overseas destinations become cheaper for Hungarians. Exchange rates do not explain everything, but this summer they could deliver the final blow to many already vulnerable hotels, restaurants and tourism businesses.


At first sight, the strengthening forint is welcome. It can make imports cheaper, ease inflationary pressure, improve the value of purchases abroad and raise the euro-denominated value of Hungarian incomes. Yet what benefits an importer, a shopper buying abroad or a Hungarian family holidaying in the eurozone can place a domestic tourism business serving both local and overseas guests at a serious competitive disadvantage.

Tourism is essentially an export sector. A foreign visitor spends income earned in euros, pounds, dollars or another currency in Hungary. When the forint strengthens, the same hotel room, restaurant meal, admission ticket or excursion becomes more expensive in the guest's currency even if the operator has not raised the forint price by a single cent.


Almost as this article was being prepared, Attila Radvánszki, a partner at Horwath HTL Hungary, published 'A New Exchange Rate Reality — Currency Realignment and the Future of Hotel Profitability in Hungary'. He also warns that the stronger forint may be not a temporary inconvenience but a structural change to the operating and profitability environment. Several of his findings match recent figures and hotel managers' accounts, although some claims deserve critical examination.



The Hotel Has Not Raised Its Price — but Foreign Guests See a Price Increase


According to the Hungarian National Bank's official exchange-rate data, one euro was worth HUF 394.68 on 23 March 2026, but only HUF 349.61 on 17 June. The forint weakened somewhat by the end of July, to HUF 362.99 per euro on 31 July, yet it remained more than 8% stronger than in late March. At its mid-June peak, the change exceeded 11%.


A HUF 60,000 hotel room costs a foreign visitor about €152 when the euro trades at HUF 395, but more than €171 at HUF 350. The hotel has not increased the forint price at all, yet the visitor perceives a price increase of roughly 13%.


The same movement benefits Hungarian travellers. A €1,000 foreign holiday costs HUF 395,000 at an exchange rate of 395 and HUF 350,000 at 350. That is an automatic HUF 45,000 saving before any promotion, loyalty benefit, last-minute deal or discounted package is applied.


A stronger forint does more than make foreign holidays cheaper. It substantially changes the value-for-money comparison between Hungarian and foreign offers. The impact is particularly acute for hotels and destinations that have already built years of rising costs into their prices and now lack the margin to counter currency effects through further substantial discounts.



June's Figures Already Sound a Warning


According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office's June 2026 release, nearly 1.9 million guests spent 4.3 million nights in tourist accommodation. Guest arrivals were down 2.2% and nights 2.5% compared with the previous year.


Domestic guest arrivals fell 2.6%, with their nights down 3.6%. Foreign guest arrivals declined 1.8% and foreign nights 1.3%. At Lake Balaton there were 1.9% fewer Hungarian and 1.7% fewer foreign guests than in June 2025.


More concerningly, gross accommodation revenue fell 0.5% in nominal terms to HUF 107.7 billion, while spending with SZÉP cards dropped 14% to HUF 3.4 billion. With operating costs still rising, stagnating nominal revenue can mean a real-term decline; a nominal reduction is an unmistakable warning.


These statistics alone do not prove the exchange rate caused the entire decline. Weather, household spending decisions, service prices, booking patterns, school-holiday timing, transport options and many other factors affect demand. But the trend matches the forint's double pressure: it makes Hungary more expensive for overseas travellers and destinations abroad cheaper for Hungarian guests.


KSH data also show that commercial accommodation, including hotels, performed better than the total tourism accommodation market on certain indicators. Commercial properties had 2.3% more guests in June; hotels had 2.2% more domestic guests and 5% more foreign guests. That need not contradict deteriorating hotel business experiences. Arrivals and occupancy alone do not show average room rates, booking lead times, total spend per visitor or the operating profit eventually earned on each occupied room.



What Hotel Managers Are Saying


Over the past few days I have spoken to managers of several hotels in Budapest, around Balaton and in other parts of the country. Independently, almost all described the same pattern: domestic guests are missing, and properties that should be fully booked or close to it at this point in summer still have significant numbers of empty rooms.


Several managers said the arriving guests are also not the familiar higher-spending customers who use multiple services. Some international travellers wait until arrival day, often the afternoon, to book heavily discounted rooms. Statistically a room is sold; commercially it may contribute very little margin. A guest who chooses almost exclusively on a last-minute special price will often spend less in the restaurant, bar and other facilities too.


Occupancy alone can therefore mislead. Selling rooms weeks or months in advance at sustainable average rates differs dramatically from filling them through substantial discounts on the afternoon of arrival. Both register as one room sold, yet their contributions to operating results are far apart.


Last-minute discounting can do longer-term damage beyond that day's room revenue. It teaches customers to wait for cheaper offers, weakens advance bookings, erodes revenue-planning certainty, destabilises staffing and drives hotels into an even more aggressive price war.


This is not a representative survey. Nevertheless, when managers of different hotel categories, regions and guest segments independently describe practically identical operating problems, it is a warning that national averages may hide.


Other market reporting supports these professional accounts. Restaurant and hospitality operators around Balaton interviewed by Világgazdaság described general revenue declines of 15–20%. László Kovács, president of the Hungarian Hospitality Guild, reported that some businesses saw turnover fall 20–30%. According to him the trend also affects Budapest, and arriving customers often spend less.


These are business experiences, not representative nationwide data. But alongside the declines in guest numbers and revenue recorded by KSH, they reveal a pattern that cannot simply be dismissed as a few bad weeks or a spell of poor weather.



Horwath HTL Has Also Identified the Currency Trap


A major point in Attila Radvánszki's analysis is structural currency mismatch. Substantial Hungarian hotel revenue is directly or indirectly linked to euros: euro-denominated corporate and MICE contracts, foreign tour operators, wholesalers, online distribution and rates benchmarked against European competitors. Salaries, energy, maintenance, food purchasing, local taxes and most other operating costs, meanwhile, are paid in forints.


If a €100 reservation previously produced HUF 40,000 but now brings in only HUF 35,000–36,000 while the property's forint costs remain, the difference directly reduces operating profit. Citing GKI, Horwath HTL estimates that forint appreciation alone may have raised euro-expressed costs by 5–6% in 2026; alongside wages and other increases, the burden on internationally exposed service businesses could be 10–11%.


I agree with this basic finding, particularly for Budapest hotels dependent on international guests, foreign corporate agreements, events and tour operators. Visitor numbers can rise while the forint value of euro-linked income falls and payroll and other expenses rise. Good occupancy or room-night statistics do not necessarily mean good profitability.


The finding does not, however, apply unchanged to the entire Hungarian hotel market. Many rural properties oriented towards domestic travellers sell and receive revenue in forints. Their primary difficulty is not conversion loss on euro receipts; it is that a stronger forint makes it easier for their Hungarian customers to choose destinations abroad.


Horwath HTL's currency mismatch helps explain the deteriorating returns of internationally oriented hotels, but it does not capture the whole domestic and regional tourism problem. The stronger currency reduces the forint value of euro-linked revenue, makes Hungary more expensive to foreigners, and diverts some Hungarian household tourism spending abroad. Three related processes reinforce each other.


Horwath HTL also acknowledges that cheaper imports and reduced inflationary pressure can ease some costs. Macroeconomically that is true, but operational relief may be limited: wages, local services, maintenance, cleaning, taxes and much food procurement remain priced in forints. Lower imported prices may not offset lost forint revenue from euro sales and rising domestic expenses.



Has the Hungarian Hotel Market Really Been Frightened?


Horwath HTL envisages a two-speed hotel market. Budapest and internationally diversified properties may prove more resilient because they can attract visitors from distant, less currency-sensitive markets and sell quality, distinctive experience and added value rather than just low prices. Balaton, rural wellness destinations and areas relying mainly on Hungarian or nearby European guests are in more direct competition with Croatia, Austria, Slovenia, Italy and other accessible alternatives.


The distinction makes sense, but the claim that Budapest has already demonstrated resilience deserves caution. Horwath HTL points largely to the capital's record 2025 room nights, airport traffic in 2025 and earlier RevPAR growth. Those are meaningful indicators from before the actual impact of the present summer season.


Higher average rates and revenue per available room in 2025 do not prove Budapest hotels maintained rates and profitability in July 2026. This is especially so when managers in Budapest also describe empty rooms, shrinking booking windows and substantial discounts advertised on the afternoon of arrival.


Budapest undoubtedly has stronger and more diverse international demand than most regions. Yet its resilience is still a reasonable hypothesis rather than a conclusion established by complete 2026 summer results. In rural and Balaton markets the demand loss already looks more immediate.



A Business Strategy Cannot Depend on the Return of a Weak Forint


Horwath HTL rightly warns hotels not to assume the euro will automatically return to HUF 390–410. The government's declared economic direction seeks to meet Maastricht criteria around 2030, move towards euro convergence and leave behind a growth model based on cheap labour and a weakening currency. A stronger, steadier forint could therefore be part of an economic-policy shift rather than a brief side effect.


Hotels should plan for multiple exchange-rate scenarios instead of waiting for a cheaper Hungary to return. Horwath HTL suggests stress-testing EUR/HUF rates from 330 to 390, expressly as planning scenarios rather than forecasts.


Still, convergence around 2030 and subsequent euro adoption remain political aims, not guaranteed exchange-rate paths. Public finances, central-bank rates, EU funds, investor confidence and implementation of reforms may substantially change the currency's trajectory.


The lesson is not that a euro will certainly cost HUF 330 or 350. It is that Hungarian tourism can no longer regard a weak forint as a natural competitive advantage. A viable tourism business should work at EUR/HUF 350 as well as 390, even if results differ.



What Can We Learn from Switzerland — and What Not?


Radvánszki draws a parallel with the Swiss franc's sudden appreciation in 2015. On 15 January of that year, the Swiss National Bank unexpectedly removed the franc's exchange-rate floor against the euro, and the currency appreciated 15–20% within minutes. Horwath HTL says some particularly exposed Swiss resort regions suffered lasting traffic losses while Zürich, Geneva and Basel adapted more rapidly through higher-value distant markets and diversification.


Its conclusion is that properties and destinations pursuing higher quality and a stronger value proposition may perform better over time than those defending volume through price cuts alone. That lesson matters. A downward price spiral does not make a destination intrinsically more competitive; it erodes profitability, reinvestment capacity and service standards. Guests get cheaper rooms initially, but later may find fewer services, neglected renovation and declining quality.


The Swiss comparison must not be accepted without context. When the franc strengthened, Switzerland already had excellent infrastructure, globally known destinations, high service quality, strong domestic purchasing power and sophisticated transport. If certain resorts still suffered persistent losses under those circumstances, the case shows not only that Hungarian hotels should adapt more effectively, but also that individual pricing, technology and cost cuts may be insufficient to solve a shock of this magnitude.


Moving upmarket is strategically sensible, but cannot happen overnight everywhere. A family hotel at Balaton, a country guesthouse or a small wellness property cannot create a high-spending American, Asian or Middle Eastern customer base between two seasons. Improving quality requires investment, qualified staff, access, destination experiences, international distribution and coordinated marketing — just when margins and liquidity are shrinking.


Horwath HTL's Czech example is useful because anticipated, institutionally managed exchange-rate changes are easier to absorb than abrupt shocks. The Czech National Bank communicated the eventual exit from its currency-appreciation limiting regime over several years, giving hotels more time to change contracts, pricing and cost structures. Hungary's large exchange-rate movement unfolded within only a few weeks.


The lesson is not merely that hotels must adapt faster. Turning a shock into a manageable transition also requires coherent economic policy, industry dialogue, timely data and opportunities for businesses to prepare.



Balaton Is No Longer Competing with Last Year's Balaton


We have previously argued that Hungary does not compete with its own past, Budapest does not compete with last year's record figures and Balaton does not compete with its previous summer. Travellers compare prices, experiences, accessibility, service, weather, things to do and overall atmosphere, rather than government communications about national records.


Croatia, Greece, Italy and Austria do not become rivals because every service there is cheaper — often that is not the case. A stronger forint narrows the price difference, while Hungarian travellers also consider beaches, weather, foreign travel experiences, transport costs and expected spending throughout the trip.


Oeconomus's 2026 Balaton–Adriatic comparison found that a five-day Balaton holiday for a family of four typically ranged from HUF 400,000 to HUF 940,000, compared with HUF 590,000 to HUF 1.4 million in Croatia. Balaton remains cheaper in many segments, but the report noted that the forint's roughly 8% appreciation materially reduced the Hungarian-currency cost of a Croatian holiday.


The study has limitations. Balaton and the Croatian coast are extremely varied markets, and many Hungarian families book apartments rather than hotels in Croatia. Comparing hotel categories may therefore miss the actual choice on booking platforms. Oeconomus itself stresses that Balaton's hotel-price advantage remained, but narrowed due to currency appreciation.


Nor is this new. As early as summer 2021, when the euro traded near HUF 350, Szalloda.blog compared Zakynthos and Balaton using specific equivalent services and consumption. That self-arranged Greek holiday was cheaper overall than a comparable Balaton stay during the same period.


This did not mean every Greek hotel or restaurant was cheaper. Travellers compare the complete holiday and the experience it promises, not only one room rate. The strong forint has again brought the euro down to a level at which those comparisons are relevant to more Hungarian households.


According to information Croatia's National Tourist Board gave Világgazdaság, both Hungarian arrivals and their room nights in Croatia rose 5% in summer 2026. This does not mean every missing Balaton visitor travelled to the Adriatic. It shows that while domestic guest traffic in Hungary declined in June, Hungarian demand grew at one of its most important competing summer destinations.



Hungarian Guests May Not Be Spending Less — They May Simply Be Spending Elsewhere


It is tempting to explain the fall in Hungarian domestic travel solely by lost household purchasing power. That is undoubtedly true for some households, but it does not explain everything. Rising visitor numbers in Croatia also suggest that some Hungarians did not abandon holidays; they chose another destination.


That matters. When a household cannot afford travel at all, it goes nowhere. When a stronger forint makes an overseas holiday cost more comparable with a domestic one, the experience, environment and services received may matter more than the nominal expenditure difference.


Hungarian tourism's challenge is therefore not merely a shortage of demand but increasingly one of competitiveness. Money available for holidays has not necessarily disappeared from tourism: a portion may simply be spent outside Hungary.


Horwath HTL primarily examines this through investors and hotel profitability. It gives less attention to the diversion of Hungarian households' spending abroad and the effects on restaurants, attractions, transport, local suppliers and entire seasonal destination economies.


The problem is not only that hotels receive fewer forints for euro-denominated rooms. It is also that a domestic guest never arrives — or travels to Croatia, Greece or Italy to spend money there instead.



Why Don't Hungarian Operators Simply Cut Prices?


From outside, lower prices may seem the obvious response for hotels, guesthouses and restaurants. But the selling price of a tourism product is not the same as its profit.


Businesses must pay wages, energy, food suppliers, laundry, cleaning, maintenance, insurance, IT, distribution commissions, taxes, financing costs and earlier investment commitments. Much of this continues even when guest numbers fall.


Our earlier article 'The Challenges of Hospitality' examined that operating cost structure. Guests see a meal, drink, terrace or experience; operators must manage procurement, wastage, labour time, technology, energy use, pricing and contribution margins. Prices set too high deter guests; prices set too low can destroy the business.


Hotels are left with three poor choices: retain rates and lose price-sensitive demand, cut rates and surrender remaining margins, or reduce costs, eventually at the expense of staffing, maintenance, amenities and quality.


The trap is that customers seek lower prices while many businesses already make very little money at current rates or are loss-making. Selling a room is not automatically success. If a discounted price contributes too little after variable costs to meet fixed costs, even higher occupancy may fail to improve viability.

Continuous markdowns can drag down the entire market. When one hotel cuts its rate sharply in the afternoon, comparable and neighbouring properties come under pressure. Booking platforms make prices instantly comparable, so a single discount may quickly trigger broader competitive cuts.


Radvánszki therefore rightly advises hotels not to rely on discounts alone. They should adapt through better quality, higher added value, new source markets, technology, cross-trained staff and more efficient operations.


That is good advice, but it would be too simple to place every responsibility on individual hotels. A well-capitalised Budapest chain may finance adaptations that an independent rural property cannot. No individual hotel can transform an entire destination's transport, attractions, international positioning or seasonality.


Technology improves efficiency but cannot create guests who are not there. Multi-skilled workers can reduce headcount requirements, but do not erase seasonal labour shortages or replace professional expertise. Higher quality commands higher prices only where the destination, transport, environment and complete guest experience support that value proposition.



Accommodation Businesses Are Not the Only Ones at Risk


Lower tourism demand does not end at the hotel or guesthouse front desk. Fewer guests can mean fewer meals and drinks sold, fewer attraction tickets, boat trips, taxis and local products, and smaller supplier orders.


Room-night figures do not show the whole change in visitor consumption. Somebody may still spend three nights somewhere but dine out less, skip wine or dessert, avoid paid attractions and spend much less outside their accommodation.


The same applies inside the hotel. Two guests can book the same discounted room, but one uses the restaurant, bar, spa and other services, while another uses only the bedroom and spends elsewhere or nowhere. Both count equally towards occupancy but contribute very differently to profit.


For a lakeside or strongly seasonal business, a few poor summer weeks are not just temporary lost revenue. Many operators rely on July and August results to finance autumn and winter, prepare the following season, maintain and refurbish their properties and invest in development.


Without that high-season reserve, investments are postponed, then staffing and services are reduced, quality deteriorates, supplier debts increase and eventually businesses close permanently or go up for sale. László Kovács warned that continued revenue decline could even force some closures during the season when staffing and operating expenses become unaffordable against unexpectedly weak demand.


This is more than individual commercial misfortune. As our earlier analysis showed, tourism is a major part of Hungary's economy. Direct and indirect effects reach jobs, suppliers, local tax revenue, municipalities and whole regional economic ecosystems.



The Strong Forint Is Not the Enemy


The answer is certainly not to deliberately weaken Hungary's currency for tourism's benefit. A competitive, higher-value tourism sector should be capable of attracting and retaining guests and operating profitably with a stable, strong currency.


The strong forint has instead exposed problems a weaker exchange rate partly concealed: fragile value for money, severe seasonality, thin reserves and how few businesses can defend their prices purely through quality, distinctive experiences, reliable service or a powerful brand.


Horwath HTL describes the same problem primarily through hotels' structural foreign-exchange exposure and rightly warns against basing long-term competitiveness on the restoration of a weak currency.


It is too optimistic, however, to treat Budapest's resilience as virtually assured before complete summer figures are available, and to place so much responsibility on individual adaptation. Quality investment, technology, cost efficiency and market diversification are essential, but cannot replace national tourism policy, targeted demand support, destination development and appropriate responses to businesses temporarily at risk.


Switzerland and Austria demonstrate that high prices do not automatically make tourism destinations uncompetitive. They become problematic when not backed by visible quality, reliability, accessibility, experiences and trust. Guests will pay more when they understand what they are paying for and can trust they will receive it.


Hungarian tourism cannot build its future on being cheap for foreigners or on foreign alternatives being unaffordable to Hungarian guests. A weak forint may conceal operational and strategic shortcomings, not cure them.


As we argued in our earlier examination of National Tourism Development Strategy 2030, serious destination planning must address complete experiences, infrastructure, mobility, services and cooperation rather than isolated projects. Tourism competes through complete experience packages, not individual hotel buildings or attractions.


The immediate need is not another record-breaking press release, generic country-brand campaign or prestige project, but honest diagnosis. Which regions and types of businesses are experiencing the sharpest decline? How are average rates and per-guest spending changing? What share of rooms is sold last minute with deep discounts? How many businesses are already at risk?


Hungary needs year-round experiences, better transport, predictable rules, professional cooperation, stronger destination management and ways to keep smaller, undercapitalised providers viable. This is not a call to sustain every unviable business with public money. Once a destination's tourism ecosystem collapses, rebuilding services can be far harder and costlier.



The Consequences of a Weak Season May Become Visible Only Later


The stronger currency alone will not destroy Hungarian tourism. It reveals how unprepared much of the market was for a world where Hungary is not automatically cheap for foreign visitors, and foreign holidays are not automatically expensive for Hungarians.


Summer 2026 is therefore about much more than who chose Croatia rather than Balaton. It tests whether Hungarian tourism remains viable when guests can freely compare European offers and exchange rates no longer protect weaker products, limited services, unconvincing experiences or unreliable operations.


Current occupancy data may still hide part of the damage. A room sold with a large discount that afternoon counts just like a room reserved at a sound price months earlier. A visitor who spends almost nothing counts the same as one buying restaurant meals, drinks, wellness treatments, excursions and local services. Both are one arrival in the statistics, but leave very different marks on the operator's bank account.


We may therefore see the full consequences of this summer only when it is too late: refurbishments cancelled in autumn, redundancies in winter, and hotels, restaurants, guesthouses and other providers that fail to reopen next spring.


Horwath HTL's central warning may be that this is not a short-lived exchange-rate fluctuation but a structural challenge to Hungary's previous tourism business model. If so, waiting for a weaker forint to restore competitiveness would be dangerous. Equally unacceptable would be leaving the state simply to watch which businesses survive and which disappear.


The real question is not merely the 2026 summer's official guest-night result. It is how many Hungarian tourism enterprises will have the income, financial reserves and access to credit to survive the next winter in this exchange-rate, cost and demand environment.


No strategy paper, conference or new record announcement will answer that question. The decisive evidence will be the coming months' bank balances — and I fear many businesses will not survive.



What Have the Government and MTÜ Done to Save Domestic Summer Tourism?


The TISZA government that took office on 12 May 2026 cannot fairly be blamed for problems accumulated in Hungarian tourism over many years. But it has had enough time to recognise the immediate danger emerging in the summer season, consult the profession and at least prepare urgent action.


By late July, however, we could see no targeted crisis programme for hotels, no substantial stimulation of domestic demand, no transitional support for businesses with serious revenue losses and no published professional assessment of the situation. We raised tourism's place within the new government and the absence of specific policy responses in our mid-June article 'Why Has Tourism Become the New TISZA Government's Neglected Child?'


MTÜ's silence is even harder to understand. Every Hungarian accommodation provider is obliged to send daily anonymous statistical information automatically to NTAK, which operates under the Agency's oversight. MTÜ should not need to wait months for traditional statistical reports to detect changes in occupancy, demand and accommodation sales.


Where is the public analysis based on those data? The consultation with the industry? The rapid intervention proposals?


Neither the TISZA government nor MTÜ caused the strong forint. Recognising and responding to the situation is, however, their responsibility.


What have they done about this particular crisis so far?

As far as the public can see: nothing.


While rooms remain empty, domestic guests stay away and hotels launch afternoon discounts to rescue same-day occupancy, industry leaders remain silent.


I fear that by the time a meaningful response arrives, it may already be too late for some businesses.



Discussion Starter: Wouldn't the Euro Be the Logical End Point?


The situation raises another long-term question scarcely discussed in Hungarian tourism. If the domestic market is so closely tied to the eurozone, wouldn't early adoption of the euro be the clearest response to recurring exchange-rate anomalies?


A substantial share of inbound guests comes from eurozone countries; hotel prices are compared with European competitors; corporate, tour-operator and events contracts are often euro-linked; and Hungarian travellers also compare Balaton, Croatia, Austria and Italy in euros. Meanwhile, operators' revenue and costs are linked to different currencies, leaving exchange movements to create an artificial advantage one year and a severe profitability disadvantage another.


Adopting the euro would eliminate nominal EUR/HUF risk, make contracts more predictable, reduce conversion costs and allow easier comparison of prices. A hotel's results could no longer change by ten percent in a few months simply because of a currency move it cannot influence. The European Central Bank lists reduced exchange-rate risk, easier planning and greater price transparency among the benefits of the common currency.


Of course the euro would not automatically resolve Hungarian tourism's competitiveness problems. It would not create better service, trained workers, stronger destinations, year-round experiences or better transport. Hungarian prices and costs could still rise faster than those of competitors. It would, however, remove the particular mismatch between currencies of earnings, operating expenses and competitive markets.


Rapid euro adoption also cannot mean swapping currencies in a single year. Hungary must meet convergence requirements for inflation, public finances, debt and long-term interest rates and participate in ERM II for at least two years without severe tensions. The real question is whether a credible accelerated and accountable accession timetable would be justified.


That brings us again to MTÜ's responsibility. The Hungarian Tourism Agency describes itself as a body responsible for improving Hungary's tourism competitiveness, with a role in preparing policy and regulatory proposals.


Has MTÜ ever examined the effects euro adoption could have on tourism, hotel profitability, domestic demand and international competitiveness?


Reviewing public MTÜ documents, the National Tourism Development Strategy and available agency materials, I found no focused analysis of euro adoption from a tourism perspective using alternative exchange-rate, demand and cost scenarios. That does not prove an internal study was never commissioned, but such work, if it exists, is not part of the public professional debate.


NTAK data, hotel financial indicators and source-market flows should equip MTÜ better than almost anyone else to model what the common currency would mean for Budapest, Balaton, rural wellness, border regions, restaurants and outbound travel by Hungarians.


The euro may not be the whole answer. It might create different risks and adjustment pressures. But an industry so strongly dependent on eurozone customers, prices, contracts and competitors should at least research and debate the issue publicly.


If much of Hungary's tourism economy already operates economically within the eurozone, while paying its costs in forints and carrying exchange-rate risk, it is fair to ask whether the euro would remove at least the most harmful distortion.


About the Author


Tamás Pakuts has worked actively in aviation and tourism for nearly 35 years, and in hotels and hospitality for more than twenty-five.


As an executive and consultant, he has worked with airlines, hotels, hotel groups and cruise companies on operations, crisis management and development.


He and his colleagues work internationally as hospitality and aviation experts, consultants and trainers, developing projects of wider international interest.

This article was translated from the original Hungarian using artificial intelligence. The original language is Hungarian.

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