Hotel & More or Hotel & Less? When White-Label Hotel Operators Fail

Hotels Falling Like Dominoes: The Risks of Choosing the Wrong White-Label Operator
The Hotel & More crisis shows the consequences of growth without a coherent concept and how unprotected guests can be when operators lack sufficient capital, effective controls and guarantees.
A family books a holiday months ahead, pays for its hotel, receives confirmation, organises travel and takes leave from work. Shortly before departure it is informed that the hotel's operator has changed. The new operator refuses the booking, while the family is instructed to reclaim its money from the company that has left the property. Does that sound familiar?
The hotel itself remains in the same place, with the same rooms and often the same employees, and is already accepting new reservations. But the guest who paid months earlier no longer has a valid room reservation.
This is not a passing administrative inconvenience or merely a settlement dispute between two companies. From the guest's perspective the same hotel demands a second payment for the same room, while the first payment must somehow be recovered from an operator whose solvency has become doubtful.
Former Hotel & More customers have reported losing prepaid holidays or services despite deposits and vouchers. Enforcement proceedings, employee wage claims and supplier debts emerged around the group, and courts ordered liquidation of several Hotel & More companies. Átlátszó, 24.hu and Világgazdaság have covered aspects of the case.
This story is bigger than the financial crisis of one Hungarian hotel operator. It is about assembling in only a few years a portfolio spread across countries and widely different sizes, categories, locations and business models. It raises the question of what protections owners require before handing their property names, room inventory and reputations to an outside operator. Hungary records almost every room night, yet does not protect the guest's prepaid money with similar thoroughness.

The White-Label Model Is Not the Problem. The Lack of Control Is.
White-label hotel management is a legitimate, established international business model. The owner provides the property and capital investment, the hotel may use its own or an international chain's brand, and specialist third-party companies carry out day-to-day operations.
A competent operator brings central sales, revenue management, financial control, procurement, HR, training, quality assurance and crisis management. The relationship works when the operator adds more financial and professional value than it costs, while the owner monitors performance, the operator's financial condition and obligations to guests rather than simply handing over the keys.
The danger begins when an operator grows faster than its financial and professional infrastructure can support.
Each additional hotel brings staff, suppliers, lease or management liabilities, technology systems and advance payments. Without adequate equity, ring-fenced client money, owner oversight and guarantees, growth may make the group more fragile rather than more resilient.
When owners terminate several contracts or take their hotels back, fewer remaining properties must cover the central overhead. Suppliers wait longer to be paid, and customer deposits can quietly become a source of daily liquidity. At that point the dominoes no longer stand independently: each relies on the next.
Many Hotels, Little Evidence of a Shared Concept
Hotel & More emerged in 2018 from a former Service4You team. Its original portfolio, according to its contemporary communications, included Akadémia Hotel in Balatonfüred, Hotel Aquarell in Cegléd, ETO Park in Győr, Garden Hotel in Debrecen, Klebelsberg Castle, Pilvax Hotel, Science Hotel and Hotel Vital. It used the name Optimum Hotels for largely three-star and seasonal operations.
Growth was rapid. By 2024 the company reported thirty-three hotels and event venues, twenty-five in Hungary and eight abroad. On the addition of East City and Thomas Hotel in early 2025 it spoke of thirty-six domestic and foreign properties.
The number impressed; the underlying concept was far less identifiable. Under the same operator appeared a sports hotel developed with TAO support, a state-owned castle hotel, a golf and wellness resort with over two hundred rooms, small regional properties, a former Danubius hotel, seasonal Balaton operations, a Budapest group hotel suitable mainly for low-budget groups, an Austrian small-town hotel, a Slovenian thermal complex and a Croatian luxury hotel.
Diversity alone is not an error. The unanswered question is which professional selection criteria governed acquisition, and what minimum room count, location, condition, category, ownership quality or expected profitability would have caused Hotel & More to decline a property.
From outside those limits were hard to see. The portfolio had no recognisable common size, quality or identity concept. Expansion itself appeared to be a goal: properties accumulated but did not form a consistently operated hotel group.
Hotel & More's Documented Portfolio by Room Count and Category
The contrast in size and positioning is striking. The group ranged from the thirteen-room Pilvax Hotel in Kalocsa to Budapest's 289-room Körszálló, from seasonal three-star properties to the 207-room, four-star-superior Greenfield Golf & Spa resort and Opatija's five-star Hotel Mozart.
These hotels did not all belong to the group simultaneously. Their rooms therefore cannot responsibly be added together as one date-specific operating capacity. The inventory nevertheless illustrates the widely differing commercial, staffing, operating and financial models a single headquarters was expected to coordinate.
Hungarian Properties
Hotel | Location | Room Count | Marketed Category |
Akadémia Hotel | Balatonfüred | 50 | 4 -star |
Hotel Aquarell | Cegléd | 92 | 4 -star |
ETO Park Hotel | Győr | 103 | 4 -star superior |
Garden Hotel Medical & Spa | Debrecen | 35 | 4 -star |
Klebelsberg Kastély | Budapest | 27 | 4 -star (marketed) |
Pilvax Hotel | Kalocsa | 13 | 3 -star |
Science Hotel | Szeged | 43 | 4 -star |
Hotel Vital | Zalakaros | 30 | 4 -star |
Hotel Família | Zamárdi | 52 | 3 -star |
Hotel Aqua Blue | Hajdúszoboszló | 58 | 3 -star |
Nostra Hotel | Siófok | 41 | 3 -star |
Greenfield Hotel Golf & Spa | Bük | 207 | 4 -star superior |
Hotel FIT | Hévíz | 51 | 3 -star |
Willis Hotel | Zalaegerszeg | 60 | 4 -star |
Világos Hotel | Balatonvilágos | 90 | 3 -star |
Forest Hills Hotel & Golf | Zirc–Szarvaskút | 21 | 4 -star |
Park Hotel Harkány | Harkány | 95 | 3 -star |
Aura Hotel | Balatonfüred | 40 | 4 -star |
Hotel Budapest/Körszálló | Budapest | 289 | 4 -star |
Residence Hotel Balaton | Siófok | 45 | 4 -star |
Active Holiday Hotel | Siófok | 38 | 3 -star |
Duna Relax Hotel | Ráckeve | 47 | 4 -star |
Oxigén Family Hotel | Noszvaj | 50 | 4 -star |
Tündérkert Hotel | Noszvaj | 40 | 3 -star |
REED Boutique Hotel & Bistro | Siófok | 23 | 4 -star |
Fried Kastélyszálló | Simontornya | 44 | 3 -star superior |
Hotel Lővér | Sopron | 180 | 3 -star superior |
Castrum Hotel | Székesfehérvár | 95 | 4 -star |
Bellevue Konferencia és Wellness Hotel | Esztergom | 80 | 4 -star |
Outlet Hotel | Polgár | 50 | 4 -star |
East City Hotel | Budapest | 179 | 4 -star (marketed) |
Thomas Hotel | Budapest | 43 | 3 -star |
Zselicvölgy Szabadidőfarm | Hajmás | 32 | Accommodation and event complex |
Properties Outside Hungary
Hotel | Location | Room Count | Marketed Category |
Stadthotel Waidhofen | Waidhofen an der Thaya, Austria | 32 | 3 -star |
Stadthotel Raabs | Raabs an der Thaya, Austria | 53 | 3 -star |
Stadthotel Gmünd-Stern | Gmünd, Austria | 40 | 4 -star |
Hotel Mozart | Opatija, Croatia | 29 | 5 -star |
Hotel Concordia | Marosvásárhely, Romania | 34 | 4 -star |
Hotel Küküllő–Târnava | Székelyudvarhely, Romania | 66 | 3 -star |
Thermal Resort Lendava | Lendva, Slovenia | 120 | 3 -star |
Landgasthof Schwarzberg | Inzell, Germany | 23 | 3 -star |
Hotel & More sometimes listed Thermal Apartments Lendava and Thermal Camping Lendava separately, although they were not independent hotels. The announced 178-room Crowne Plaza Katowice also should not be counted as an operating property. An agreement to manage a planned future project is not the same as taking over an open hotel.
A twenty-one-room golf property in the Bakony, a forty-room adults-oriented hotel at Balaton, a 179-room Budapest group hotel and a 207-room wellness resort are not four sizes of the same product. They require different markets, distribution, staffing, costs and management expertise. An accomplished white-label company can manage all four, but only with far more than a common website, loyalty programme or booking engine.
It was difficult from outside to identify a firm portfolio admission standard at Hotel & More. That does not prove that accepting any particular property was a professionally unsound decision. Viewed together, however, the portfolio suggested expansion without a consistent concept.

Mogotel: A Model for Building a World-Class White-Label Operator

Mogotel offers not just a positive contrast but a useful model for growing as a hotel operator. Established in Latvia in 2002 and headquartered in Riga, it expanded from the Baltic states into the region's largest hotel operator by property and room numbers. It operates its own brands and hotels affiliated with Accor, IHG, Wyndham and Marriott.
Its reach extends beyond Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and Ukraine. It works on its own developments as well as international brand partnerships.
Mogotel has reached the leading ranks of international white-label hotel operators. Its decisions are no longer driven by whether it can find another property, but which offered projects fit its system. It receives approaches for Swiss, Italian and other Western European projects, yet these do not automatically turn into contracts because the company can choose.
The group generally targets well-located city and sometimes airport hotels, typically with at least one hundred rooms. It combines strict selection and operating standards with central sales, revenue management, financial controls, international brand relationships and its own investments.
The hundred-room guideline is not arbitrary. A sophisticated head office supporting sales, finance, procurement, training and quality assurance is hard to fund from very small properties. A strong city or airport location may support multiple guest segments and steadier year-round demand than a heavily seasonal weekend hotel.
Mogotel has a recognisable view of which properties fit its model. It is not a good white-label operator simply because it has many hotels, but because it can decline projects it cannot operate effectively and profitably.
Not Uniquely Hungarian: Europe's Hotel Operating Model Is Under Pressure
It would be easy to present Hotel & More as a peculiarly Hungarian case: rapid portfolio expansion, a difficult-to-map corporate structure, different owner groups, departing hotels and unsettled guest prepayments. Yet major hotel operators have also entered insolvency proceedings in Germany, one of Europe's most sophisticated and regulated hotel markets, over the past two years.
Those examples show that trouble is not determined only by size or reputation. Prestigious established brands, international franchises, advanced digital concepts and portfolios of hundreds of hotels can still fail when costs, lease commitments and integration burdens exceed the system's capacity.
Revo Hospitality: From 51 to 250 Hotels in Five Years

Revo Hospitality Group, formerly HR Group, is a major parallel. It became one of Europe's biggest white-label operators, managing Accor, IHG, Wyndham, Hilton and Marriott hotels alongside its own brands. The façade displayed a globally familiar hotel name, while daily operations depended on a third party largely invisible to guests.
In January 2026, Revo applied for self-administered insolvency proceedings involving about 140 group companies. Initial reports identified 125 hotels in Germany and Austria and approximately 5,500 employees directly affected. The wider group operated roughly 250–260 hotels and more than 38,000 rooms in twelve European countries.
Its portfolio stood at fifty-one hotels in 2020 and grew to approximately 250 within a few years. According to the company, taking over and integrating properties created substantial costs while 2025 room nights and revenue did not reach plan. Wage, lease, energy and food inflation and parallel organisational structures retained after acquisitions added further pressure.
The parallel with Hotel & More concerns not size but the gap between portfolio expansion and organisational capacity. New hotels produce turnover, deposits and impressive headline counts, but also larger central costs, duplicate systems and difficulties retaining effective control of local operations.
Pandox: How a Professional Owner Protects Itself

Swedish listed hotel-property owner Pandox offers one of the most instructive responses to Revo's insolvency. Nine of its German hotels, totalling 1,859 rooms, had been operated by Revo-linked companies. Pandox disclosed that its financial exposure was reduced by a bank guarantee equivalent to one year's rent.
Pandox did not assume a large, fast-growing operator could never run into trouble. It anticipated the risk and required security that reduced the owner's losses if the operator failed.
That bank guarantee primarily protected rental income for the owner, not guests' deposits directly. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that operator insolvency is a foreseeable commercial risk, not an unpredictable natural disaster. Similar thinking could support segregated guest-deposit accounts or guarantees specifically covering the fulfilment of confirmed reservations.
Lindner: When Even a Prestigious German Brand Is Not Protected by Its History

Lindner Hotels AG was a respected long-established family business, not an obscure portfolio. Founded by Otto Lindner in 1973, it built a leading German privately owned hotel brand through urban business hotels, resorts, golf and wellness properties and the more modern me and all hotels.
In 2022 Lindner agreed a strategic relationship with Hyatt Hotels Corporation. Its Lindner Hotels & Resorts and me and all hotels brands were associated with Hyatt's JdV by Hyatt collection. A half-century-old family company allied with a global hotel group could look exceptionally stable.
Nevertheless, Lindner Hotels AG initiated self-administered insolvency proceedings in December 2024. Thirteen directly operated German hotels were affected, while the wider Lindner Hotel Group comprised thirty-four properties across European countries and the United States. Operations continued, and the group later reorganised and reduced its portfolio to twenty-nine hotels.
Lindner demonstrates that a long history, professional reputation, established family name and Hyatt-level partner cannot replace sustainable finances. If such an established operator was not automatically protected, no hotel owner should assume that a less transparent fast-growing operator makes bank guarantees, regular audits or a crisis plan unnecessary.
ACHAT: An Operator Change Need Not Harm Guests

ACHAT Hotels and subsidiary LOGINN Hotels began self-administered insolvency proceedings in November 2024. At announcement the group contained forty-nine hotels and about 1,450 staff; operations and guest reservations continued during the process.
During restructuring, other operators took over eighteen hotels, one closed, and ACHAT continued with thirty-two hotels and roughly 4,100 rooms. According to the company's legal advisers, the transitions largely preserved guest bookings, customer relationships and jobs.
That is a decisive contrast with Hotel & More. A change of operator does not inevitably mean that guests lose rooms or money. An orderly transition involving the property owner, outgoing and incoming operators and insolvency professionals can preserve bookings and contractual obligations.
Sonder: A Clear Concept and Selected Properties Still Weren't Enough

Sonder is instructive precisely because its portfolio did not lack a concept. It knew whom it intended to attract: digital nomads, Generation Z and, in the longer term, Generation Alpha travellers growing up in a fully digital environment.
It offered a hybrid between traditional hotels and short-let apartments: central city locations, bold design, digital check-in, mobile-managed services, kitchens, an informal residential feel, longer stays and community or club-like elements. Digital customer relationships were central.
Sonder did not randomly distribute apartments across an online marketplace. It selected properties and operated them under coherent design and technology principles. We stayed at its Nice property ourselves, and the promise was obvious: a good location, distinctive interiors, independence, technological convenience and fewer traditional hotel constraints. It felt like a consciously built modern hospitality brand, not an anonymous apartment network.
In 2024 Sonder signed a twenty-year licence agreement with Marriott International. It planned to bring over 9,000 units into Marriott Bonvoy under the Sonder by Marriott Bonvoy name, seeking liquidity, global distribution and loyalty-programme access.
Technology integration took longer than expected, costs were higher and revenues lower. In November 2025 Marriott terminated the agreement citing Sonder's breach, removing properties from its distribution system. Sonder subsequently closed US operations, sought liquidation and began insolvency proceedings elsewhere.
Approximately 140 Sonder properties and nearly 7,700 rooms were removed from Marriott's platform. Some guests were told to leave while already occupying prepaid accommodation; others reportedly had only twenty-four hours to find replacement rooms.
Sonder completes the lesson. Hotel & More lacked a recognisable portfolio concept, whereas Sonder had a clear audience, strong design, digital systems, carefully selected properties, a club-like experience and an international brand partner. Yet even that business model did not generate sustainable returns. A strong concept is necessary, but not sufficient.
Example | What Happened? | Main Lesson |
Mogotel | Developed from a Baltic operator into an international white-label group with strict criteria on size, location and quality | A strong operator chooses which hotels it can run well |
Revo | Grew from 51 to approximately 250 hotels in five years | Fast acquisition without integration or adequate capital is dangerous |
Lindner | A longstanding German prestige brand with a Hyatt relationship | Reputation and a global brand partner cannot replace financial stability |
ACHAT | Eighteen hotels moved to other operators after insolvency | An orderly handover can preserve guest reservations |
Sonder | Built a digital design-led, carefully selected portfolio | An innovative concept still fails if the economics cannot fund it |
Hotel & More | Operated an extremely mixed portfolio by size, category and location | Without defined selection standards, capital and guarantees, the group becomes vulnerable |

What Did It Really Mean to Be a Hotel & More Hotel?

Portfolio membership did not always involve the same degree of operational responsibility. Hotel & More's own website described management, franchise, lease and operating agreements, four legally and financially different relationships.
At some properties H&M or its project company was the legal accommodation provider. Elsewhere the local operator remained in place and H&M provided management, sales or marketing services. Guests typically saw only that the hotel could be booked through Hotel & More, joined its common loyalty scheme and accepted H&M gift vouchers.
Example | What the Documented Arrangement Shows |
Thomas Hotel | L44 Hungary Hotel Management Kft. was already the accommodation provider before the hotel joined H&M |
Világos Hotel | Optimum Füred Kft. remained named on the operating side, so this was not simply a new provider taking over |
Residence, Duna Relax, Oxigén and Tündérkert | Owners remained largely unchanged while management moved from Eventrend to H&M and then Hilaris |
Hotel Lővér | Danubius remained owner; K&M Hotel Management took over operations on 1 April 2026 after H&M |
Hotel Aquarell | The MFB-owned property has been operated by Hunguest since June 2023 |
Hotel Budapest/Körszálló | Ownership transferred from Danubius to the Market group; the hotel closed on 5 January 2025 |
Bellevue Hotel | After H&M, Victus & T. Kft. became the service provider; handling prepaid bookings became a separate problem |
Documented Owner Backgrounds and Operator Changes
Not every property's full ownership chain could be confirmed. The following comparison includes only ownership and management transitions for which documentation was available, without speculation.
Hotel | Ownership Background | Operator or Status After H&M |
Hotel Aquarell | MFB-Ingatlanfejlesztő Zrt. | Hunguest Hotels Zrt., since June 2023 |
ETO Park Hotel | From the Quaestor assets to the WHB/Attila Paár circle | ETO HOTEL Kft. |
Klebelsberg Castle | Previously Hungarian state property, later foundation ownership | Pro Cultura Kft. |
Hotel Vital | Previously Lakatos family, ITH-Hungary circle since 2022 | Hotel Vital-ITH Kft. |
Hotel FIT | IPOSZ | IPOSZ-linked operator resumed management |
Hotel Budapest/Körszálló | Danubius, later Market Asset Management/Garancsi circle | Closed on 5 January 2025 |
Residence Hotel Balaton | Péter Zentai's business interests | Hilaris Hotels |
Duna Relax Hotel | Péter Zentai's business interests | Hilaris Hotels, since March 2026 |
Oxigén Family Hotel | Péter Zentai's business interests | Hilaris Hotels, since 31 January 2026 |
Tündérkert Hotel | Péter Zentai's business interests | Hilaris Hotels, since 31 January 2026 |
REED | Péter Zentai's business interests | Hilaris Hotels |
Hotel Lővér | Danubius Hotels Zrt. | K&M Hotel Management Kft., since 1 April 2026 |
Bellevue Hotel | Change of service provider after H&M documented | Victus & T. Kft., since April 2026 |
Hotel Mozart | MANEVI Jagera group | MANEVI Jagera d.o.o. |
Hotel Concordia | Manevi Pro Transilvania, Hungarian state background | Local operation |
Hotel Küküllő–Târnava | Hotel Tarnava 2000 SRL | Hotel Tarnava 2000 SRL |
A pattern recurs: owners retained their buildings while operators changed. That matters to guest deposits. Owners could regain operating properties and continue selling the same rooms through new operators even where some old reservations and advance payments remained with their former managers.
Predominantly Political and State-Business Connections?
The portfolio included private, state, institutional and foreign owners. It is nevertheless documented that some publicly developed, state-owned and closely NER-associated properties were connected with the company.
Hotel | Documented Public Funding or Business-Political Link |
Akadémia Hotel | Handball project financed with TAO funding |
Hotel Aquarell | MFB ownership |
Klebelsberg Castle | State-funded reconstruction followed by foundation ownership |
ETO Park Hotel | Moved to the WHB/Attila Paár circle after the Quaestor assets |
Hotel Budapest/Körszálló | Purchased by the Market group associated with István Garancsi |
Greenfield Hotel | The Minerva circle associated with László Szíjj emerged during H&M's period |
Hotel Concordia | Hungarian state-owned MANEVI interest |
Thermal Resort Lendava | Cross-border investment with Hungarian state background |
The point is not to give all these properties one political label. The real question is how an operator obtained contracts for so many state, institutional and well-capitalised owners' hotels without the risks now visible being addressed earlier.
It is legitimate to ask what due diligence preceded these agreements, what bank guarantees were requested, whether tax, payroll and supplier debts were regularly checked, and who monitored where guest deposits were held and on what basis. We should also ask what property owners did when management relationships began ending one after another.

Property Owners Cannot Completely Wash Their Hands of the Matter
As a general rule, a guest's contractual claim is against the company that confirmed the reservation and collected the money. That does not mean the property's owner bears no professional or moral responsibility.
The owner selected the operator and authorised it to market rooms using the property's name, images and reputation. The guest paid because of trust in that hotel, not after studying an unfamiliar project company's balance sheet.
If an owner failed to demand adequate guarantees, monitor deposits or plan for an operator's failure, they chose their partner poorly. The entire consequence should not simply be passed to guests while the owner resells the rooms through another company.
Professional hotel owners may require a bank guarantee, parent-company guarantee, security deposit or cover equivalent to several months' rent. The next step should be securing not only rent due to the owner but also reservations already paid for by guests.

Who Protects Hotel Guests' Deposits Today?
Standalone hotel reservations are not covered by one unified insolvency-protection arrangement comparable to package travel. EU package-travel rules require protection for refunds when an organiser becomes insolvent and for repatriation where necessary. A separately booked hotel room has no equivalent general Europe-wide deposit guarantee.
Option | What It Can Do | Principal Limitation |
Card chargeback | Dispute a card payment when a prepaid service was not delivered | Subject to deadlines and bank investigation; not automatic |
Platform-managed payment | Platform may refund the funds it collected | The platform does not collect payment for every booking |
Package holiday | Tour organiser's insolvency protection may cover the accommodation | An individual hotel room is not a travel package |
Travel insurance | Some optional policies cover service-provider insolvency | Basic policies often exclude it |
Claim in liquidation | A creditor may formally register the debt | Recovery may be slow and only partial |
Consumer authority or mediation | Can assist enforcement of rights and investigate disclosures | Cannot replace money missing from an insolvent company |
Chargeback is not a Hungarian invention but a procedure under international card-network rules. Our guide for Robinson Tours customers explains the relevant conditions and documentation in detail.

One function of Booking.com's managed payments is to handle transactions, disputes and refunds. But that does not cover every Booking.com booking. Guests need to establish who actually charged their card and who holds the deposit.
Our Robinson Tours reporting examined how a tour operator selling charter-flight packages could have held only BGN 125,000, about €63,900, in insurance. Package holidays and stand-alone hotel rooms fall under different laws, but the common problem remains: an insurance instrument on paper is not enough if its size and workings fail to match actual turnover and risk.

Make It Compulsory to Disclose Who Operates Each Hotel
Hungary records accommodation providers through municipal registration and NTAK. Yet guests often find the legal entity only in privacy policies, terms and conditions or invoices, sometimes after payment. Government Decree 239/2009 (X. 20.) sets the foundation of accommodation registration rules.
Every hotel website, booking engine and prepayment summary should clearly identify the property owner, accommodation provider's full registered company name, actual management or operating company, invoicing and deposit-collecting entities, and NTAK registration number. It should disclose the advance-payment guarantee and who will honour bookings after an operator change.
This information should not hide three clicks away in a privacy policy. It belongs where the guest clicks the payment button.
Where Were the Authorities?
Consumer-protection authorities are not bank supervisors and do not continuously audit hotel operators' solvency. Municipal authorities register accommodation providers and enforce operating requirements; NTAK collects data; NAV monitors taxes; company courts record corporate legal status.
Each sees a separate part of the picture. But to a guest whose deposit is missing, it makes no practical difference whether the problem lies in company law, tax law, consumer protection or insolvency. They need to know whether the room will be available and whether money will be returned.
Hungary lacks an early-warning mechanism connecting repeated enforcement action, tax arrears, wage complaints, owner contract terminations and guest claims. By the time each issue becomes a separate official case, significant prepayments may already have been absorbed into routine operating liquidity.
Where Was the Hotel Association?
The Hungarian Hotel and Restaurant Association is not a regulator and has no power to inspect a private operator's books. But professional advocacy responsibilities do not end with awards, conferences, statistics and lobbying.
When an important operator repeatedly loses properties, affiliated companies face enforcement proceedings, and staff, suppliers and guests describe unpaid amounts, an industry association should ask questions. Not only after the press has revealed the case, but when early warning signs appear.
Professional Minimum | Purpose |
Owner and operator transparency | Clarify responsibility |
Tax and wage-payment compliance | Make professional membership imply a genuine financial baseline |
Segregated guest-deposit handling | Prevent guest money from financing unlimited daily operations |
Bank or parent-company guarantee | Provide cover if the operator fails |
Regular financial audits | Detect problems before insolvency |
Compulsory crisis and rebooking plan | Do not leave guests unprotected during operator change |
Owner responsibility declaration | Confirm that owners oversee the operator they selected |
An industry association's silence is not neutral when the entire market's reputation is threatened. If guests lose their money, the damage spreads from one operating company to confidence in Hungarian hotels generally.
What Should Hungary Change in Hotel Regulation Now?
The Hotel & More case cannot be closed simply because many hotels found new operators. Properties may continue trading, but unpaid guests, staff and suppliers — and the deficiencies in the system — do not disappear.
Proposal | Problem Addressed |
Compulsory operator transparency | Show guests the owner, legal provider, operator and payment collector before checkout |
Segregated guest prepayment account | Prevent unrestricted use of deposits as daily working capital |
Bank, insurance or parent-company guarantee | Cover the consequences of operator failure |
Mandatory transfer of bookings and deposits | Ensure confirmed guest reservations transfer with the hotel when operators change |
Limited secondary owner liability | Make owners liable in defined cases for operators they selected |
Early-warning system | Trigger checks from enforcement cases, tax arrears and wage complaints together |
Professional operator certification | Make industry association certification reflect genuine financial and operating minimums |
Hotel deposit protection | Require guarantees above defined payment amounts or booking lead times |
The exact legal form of subsidiary owner liability needs careful development. It would not be reasonable to make every owner automatically and without limit responsible for all operator debts. But where an owner allowed an operator to collect advance payments in the hotel's name and for its benefit, the owner should not be able to regard itself as entirely uninvolved after changing operators.

This Damaged More Than One Company's Reputation — It Damaged Hungarian Hospitality
The Hungarian hotel market should not be judged by one operator. Many properties are owned and managed by stable, responsible and professionally competent companies.
But guests do not see the corporate chart. They know that they paid for a Hungarian hotel and did not receive a room. If that happens at several apparently independent properties, confidence in vouchers, prepayment, operator transitions and eventually Hungarian hotels all suffers.
A guest's deposit must not become free working-capital financing for an undercapitalised operator. Owners cannot say the issue has nothing to do with them if they chose the business that sold rooms under their hotel's name. Regulators cannot be satisfied merely because each piece of information exists somewhere in a different register, and the industry association should not wait until the situation has become a national media story and liquidation case.
Hungary needs white-label hotel operators, but their growth must be backed by capital, a coherent concept, strict standards, owner oversight and genuine guarantees. Otherwise an operator's failure can bring down reservations, deposits, employees' livelihoods, suppliers' claims and ultimately trust in the whole industry.
Sources
Related Szalloda.blog Articles
About the Author

Tamás Pakuts has worked in aviation and tourism for almost thirty-five years and in hotels and hospitality for more than twenty-five.
As an executive and consultant, he has been involved in the operations, crisis management and development of airlines, hotels, hotel groups and cruise companies.
He and his colleagues work across many countries as hospitality and aviation specialists, advisers and trainers developing internationally relevant projects.
This article was translated from the original Hungarian using artificial intelligence. The original language is Hungarian.
.png)




Comments