Wizz Air CEO's Optimism Questioned — But Aviation Has a Future

József Váradi, chief executive of Wizz Air, described the pandemic and the restrictions introduced during its first wave as 'mass hysteria' last year. At the same time, he toured the Hungarian and international media with an extraordinarily optimistic message.
One year later, it is evident that this unquestionably talented aviation executive, once regarded as almost visionary, was badly mistaken when he predicted a rapid recovery of tourism and especially aviation by the summer of 2020. It is difficult to know whether he was speaking primarily to employees, travellers or shareholders when he seemed unwilling to confront the severity of the damage COVID-19 would inflict on the sector.
In an April 2020 interview with Bloomberg, he said:
'Before the COVID-19 crisis Wizz had €1.5 billion ($1.6 billion) in cash, and still does, after implementing cost-cutting measures including a 50% reduction in employee salaries and the suspension of top management pay. Monthly expenditure has been reduced to approximately €90 million and will soon fall further to €70 million as the target of reducing variable costs by 80% is achieved.'
Ten months have since passed. If we accept Váradi's optimism about cost reductions, we might conclude that Wizz Air's cash reserves have diminished by at least €700 million. Of course, the airline also had revenue during what he called 'mass hysteria', particularly from government contracts that the author considers overpriced. But that income may not have helped enough, particularly given reports of significant payment delays affecting some suppliers.
In an interview with Reuters on 1 January 2021, Váradi offered another set of numbers and similarly interesting statements. He said Wizz Air held €1.6 billion in cash, sufficient to survive even if every aircraft remained grounded for two years.
'Wizz says its €1.6 billion ($1.96 billion) cash pile means it could survive two years with all aircraft grounded.'
By this account, Wizz Air had apparently managed its finances so well during the previous ten months that it had increased its cash holdings by €100 million.
Váradi's statements about the figures are highly contradictory, although substantial borrowing might make them technically possible. They do not necessarily reflect the real condition of Wizz Air or the wider industry. Discussing the underlying challenges in detail might be uncomfortable when addressing investors who still put their confidence in shares the author believes are significantly overvalued and comparatively thinly traded.
The numbers seem as confused as his vision for the future of aviation and tourism.
'I think that if restrictions are lifted by summer, summer 2021 would not be very far from summer 2019 for us,' he said. 'That would not be the case for many other airlines.'
This reflects, in the author's view, an excessively optimistic assessment of willingness to travel after COVID-19 and the financial circumstances of potential customers, combined with another swipe at competitors. The former is a serious analytical error; the latter is a matter of business culture during an exceptionally difficult period for everybody.
People's living conditions and therefore their travel habits have changed substantially over the past year. The longer the pandemic and restrictions last, the more seriously they will undermine mass tourism. Yet mass-market passenger volumes form the core of Wizz Air's business model — what Váradi describes as earning through a very large number of small payments.
If 2021 genuinely becomes a year of restarting travel, many people will initially choose destinations in their own country or neighbouring countries that can be reached easily by car. Others will be unable to afford even that. Millions of discounted five-euro airline tickets are unlikely to restore demand to previous levels for these reasons.
A fundamental change in travel habits must be expected at least in the short term, because COVID-19 has changed how people think. Not only leisure tourism but also business travel is likely to contract, with part of the reduction in corporate travel potentially becoming permanent.
Those who continue to fly will increasingly choose airlines offering transparent fares, high service standards and hygiene conditions above the industry average. As Váradi himself acknowledges, the pandemic has damaged the sector. Bankruptcies have already begun and the process is far from over. Some operators will not manage the challenges of restarting operations, which can be even more expensive than running on a reduced schedule.
There are traditional national airlines that governments will continue to support. The pandemic and European Union policy allow such intervention, and in the present situation these carriers must be protected.
A country has a strategic interest in the stability of its airline, just as it has in reliable electricity, oil and natural-gas supplies.
During the shutdown, leading European airlines made up much of the fleet-modernisation gap that had previously given low-cost competitors an advantage. They also undertook overdue restructuring out of necessity, potentially improving their efficiency and competitiveness.

It is important to recognise that privately owned airlines, including discount carriers, will coexist with genuine national airlines. Those national carriers do not merely claim the title for political effect — as the author believes Wizz Air does when calling itself a 'de facto national airline' — but have real state backing through ownership or governance. A private low-cost carrier cannot simply replace their strategic role.
Governments cannot allow themselves to depend entirely on companies that may make rapid decisions based on short-term commercial priorities. That principle applies to Hungary too.
Fortunately, Hungary's government currently has no airline to rescue. The airline sometimes promoted as a national carrier, Wizz Air, claims to be in such good condition that, in Váradi's own words, it could 'survive even if its aircraft did not fly for two years'.

In this chaotic situation, which nevertheless offers significant opportunities, almost every airline — including Wizz Air — has been pushed back towards the starting line. Political decision-makers should consider whether this is the moment to rebuild a competitive national airline on a strong professional foundation.
The brand, market conditions, available aviation expertise and costs of entry could all permit the development of a new Malév, a genuine Hungarian national airline.
About the author:
Ferenc Galgóczy is the CEO of BUDPORT. He is also associated with GO4 Travel, which previously operated as a Wizz Air customer-service and partner travel agency.
This article was translated from the original Hungarian using artificial intelligence. The original language is Hungarian.
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